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The court in Collicott, however, did not resolve the more im-
portant question of precisely what is an uninsured driver or,
more specifically, whether an underinsured driver is an unin-
sured driver as to an unsatisfied claim. These questions remain
open for future resolution by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
EVA M. SOEKA
LABOR LAW
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Milwaukee Deputy Sher-
iffs' Association v. Milwaukee County,' addressed the issue of
whether, after a petition for final and binding arbitration has
been filed pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 111.77(4)(b),
a party to the negotiations may amend its final offer to include
a proposal not previously subject to the negotiation process.
The Association and the County were in the process of nego-
tiating a contract for 1973 when the association filed with the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) for
binding arbitration under section 111.77(4)(b), alleging that an
impasse had been reached. WERC appointed an officer who
held two meetings with the parties. Thereafter the County
modified its "final offer," by incorporating a proposal for a two,
rather than a one year contract. The matter of a two year
contract had not been mentioned during the negotiations be-
fore the petition for binding arbitration was filed. When WERC
directed the parties to submit their final offers, the County
submitted its amended final proposal, and the County's pack-
age, with the two year contract, was eventually accepted.
The trial court overturned the arbitrator's decision, and the
supreme court affirmed. The court held that to allow an arbi-
trator to consider issues raised for the first time in binding
arbitration would be contrary to the purpose behind binding,
compulsory arbitration which is to resolve negotiable differ-
ences by narrowing the issues to be resolved. The court deter-
mined that for binding arbitration to be effective, no new mat-
ters presented for the first time after the filing of a petition for
arbitration shall be accepted as it "flies directly into the teeth
of the statute."'2 The court also pointed out that to allow such
1. 64 Wis. 2d 651, 221 N.W.2d 673 (1974).
2. Id. at 658, 221 N.W.2d at 676.
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proposals to be considered would render all negotiations pre-
vious to binding arbitration meaningless. Therefore, the court
vacated the arbitrator's award as having exceeded his statutory
power.3
In State ex rel. Department of Public Instruction v. ILHR,l
the court was faced with the question of whether one state
agency, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Rela-
tions (DILHR) has jurisdiction over other state agencies in
discrimination cases. Pursuant to a complaint of sex discrimi-
nation by an employee of the Department of Public Instruction
(DPI), DILHR served DPI with a notice of hearing. DPI then
brought the present action to have the jurisdictional question
resolved.
While admitting that the scope of the Wisconsin Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act5 is broad and to be liberally construed,
the court pointed out that the state is not a body expressly
included in the Act and, therefore, DILHR "has no jurisdiction
over the employment practices of DPI."
It was shown that the State had been explicitly included in
other employment statutes, 7 but not the Fair Employment Act,
and that a general regulatory statute like the one at issue would
not apply to the State unless expressly included in the statu-
tory scheme. The court, therefore, concluded that DILHR
could not continue to process complaints against the state and
urged the legislature to remedy the situation statutorily.
The court also dealt with the issue of federal preemption in
Lodge 76 v. WERC.1 In that case, the supreme court deter-
mined that where conduct by a union is neither prohibited nor
protected by federal legislation, the State is free to regulate
such activity if Congress has not "focused upon"9 the activity,
leaving it unregulated.
The employer, Kearney and Trecker, Inc., filed a charge
with WERC alleging that the union had violated section
3. Wis. STAT. § 298.10 (1973).
4. 68 Wis. 2d 677, 229 N.W.2d 591 (1975).
5. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-37 (1973).
6. 68 Wis. 2d at 684, 229 N.W.2d at 595.
7. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(2)(c) (1973) (the safe place statute); Wis. STAT. §
102.04(1)(a) (1973) (workmen's compensation); Wis. STAT. § 108.02(4)(a) (1973) (un-
employment compensation).
8. 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975).




111.06(2) (h) of the Wisconsin Statutes by interfering with pro-
duction. The interference alleged was the encouragement and
coercion of employees to refuse overtime in a dispute over the
length of the workweek. The union contended that since the
alleged activity had not been proscribed by federal regulation,
it was permitted and therefore protected by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), and was exempt from state regulation.
Citing UAW v. WERB' ° and San Diego Unions v. Garmon,"
the Wisconsin court reasoned that the states are preempted
from regulating only conduct which is (1) protected by the
NLRA; (2) prohibited by the NLRA; or (3) neither protected
nor prohibited because of a congressional intent to do so. The
court declared that conduct in this third category must have
been "focused upon" by federal regulation, even if not specifi-
cally prohibited nor permitted. The court determined that a
concerted refusal of overtime was a partial strike of a kind not
"focused upon" by federal legislation and therefore subject to
regulation by the WERC.
Mahnke v. WERC12 dealt with the determination of the
proper procedure for an individual to proceed to the merits of
a grievance when a grievance procedure provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement has not been exhausted. The
plaintiff, Harold Mahnke, filed an unfair labor practice suit
against his employer, the Louis Allis Company, for allegedly
violating section 111.06(1)(f) of the Wisconsin Statutes which
declares it an unfair labor practice to "violate the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement.' 3 Mahnke had been dis-
charged for a poor attendance record, having missed 100 days
of work over a two and one-half year period due to health rea-
sons. His union took the grievance through four of the five steps
contractually provided for, but refused to take it to arbitration.
The company defended at the trial court level by alleging that
Mahnke was discharged for a just cause and that, as his griev-
ance had not been advanced to the fifth step by his union, his
complaint could be processed no further. The court stated the
controlling issue to be:
Where an employee alleges that his employer has discharged
10. UAW v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
11. San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12. 66 Wis. 2d 524, 225 N.W.2d 617 (1975).
13. Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1)(f) (1973).
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him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
that his union has failed to proceed to arbitration under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, does the em-
ployee have the burden of proof to establish a want of fair
representation on the part of the union before he can proceed
to the merits of his claim? 4
The court determined that although there was no expressed
agreement by the employer and the collective bargaining agent
that the grievance procedure was to be the exclusive remedy for
handling complaints, the court believed that such a presump-
tion existed. Relying on Vaca v. Sipes,'5 the court indicated
that where the employer and the union, being the only parties
capable of implementing the advanced stages of a grievance
arbitration procedure, refuse to advance a claim, it would be
inequitable to allow an employee's grievance to go without
remedy because of the union's wrongful refusal to press the
charge. The court adopted the rule that where a grievance pro-
cedure has not been exhausted, it must be shown by the em-
ployee bringing suit that the union failed in its duty of fair
representation before he can prosecute his claim against the
employer. The employee must demonstrate that the union's
decision was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."'"
The court determined that the burden in similar unfair
labor practice cases shall fall first upon the employer to show
that the existing grievance procedure has not been exhausted.
When that burden is satisfied, the burden shall fall upon the
employee to prove that his union breached its duties of fair
representation to him before he can proceed to the prosecution
of his claim against the employer.
In Mahnke, the court also set out the various considerations
a union must entertain in determining whether to press a griev-
ance or not. Relying on Vaca, 7 the court said a union must:
...take into account at least the monetary value of his
claim, the effect of the breach on the employee and the likeli-
hood of success in arbitration. . . .[A] decision not to arbi-
trate based solely on economic considerations could be arbi-
trary and a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 8
14. 66 Wis. 2d at 529, 225 N.W.2d at 620-21.
15. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
16. 66 Wis. 2d at 531, 225 N.W.2d at 622.
17. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
18. 66 Wis. 2d at 534, 225 N.W.2d at 623.
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The court remanded the case for a determination of whether
the union failed in its duty of fair representation by the stan-
dards set out in the opinion.
In State v. WERC' 9 the court held that an administrative
order of WERC denying the employer state's motion to dismiss
was not a "decision" within the meaning of chapter 227 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, and therefore was not appealable. The
employer and union filed motions to dismiss claimant Guth-
rie's unfair labor practice charge which alleged that he was
dismissed without just cause and that his union had breached
its duties of fair representation by not taking his grievance to
arbitration within the time permitted. The defendants' mo-
tions were denied on the ground that the Wisconsin Statutes
require a full hearing of "contested cases."""
At the hearing, held January 30, 1973, evidence was intro-
duced that Guthrie had been discharged without just cause and
that his union had represented him fairly. Upon adjournment
the examiner took under advisement motions to dismiss by
both defendants, as well as a motion by the employer to have
a ruling first on the fair representation issue. On February 6,
the employer moved for summary judgment. The examiner on
March 12, 1973, ruled all previous motions premature since the
fair representation and just cause questions were comingled
and ordered further hearings. The employer then petitioned
WERC to review the order for further hearings, which petition
was also ruled premature, as was a subsequent appeal of the
employer's summary judgment motion.
The supreme court, relying on a 1973 Wisconsin case " de-
termined that the State, as the employer, could not appeal an
order of WERC, as it was not an appealable decision under
Wisconsin Statutes, chapter 227. The court also pointed out
that the denial of the State's motions did not "directly affect
the legal rights, duties or privileges of a person."2 The court
reasoned that the State's rights, duties and privileges had not
been affected, since it could still argue the issue of exclusive-
ness of the grievance procedure at the continued hearing, and
then have the opportunity to appeal a subsequent adverse de-
termination by the WERC.
19. 65 Wis. 2d 624, 223 N.W.2d 543 (1974).
20. WIS. STAT. §§ 227.01(2) and 227.04 (1971).
21. Pasch v. Dept. of Revenue, 58 Wis. 2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973).
22. State v. WERC, 66 Wis. 2d 534, 634, 223 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1974).
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The court also denied the employer's request for a declara-
tory judgment, based on section 269.56 of the Wisconsin Stat-
utes. The employer had asked the court to declare its motion
to dismiss, and petition to review the order denying the motion,
the proper procedure to be followed in actions of this kind. The
court reasoned that use of declaratory judgments under section
269.56 was intended to expedite litigation, not to interrupt it
for purposes of intermediate review. The court affirmed the
view that the exclusive vehicle for review of such cases is the
procedure provided by chapter 227, and not a declaratory judg-
ment.
The supreme court entertained the issue of recognition or-
ders as an alternative to cease and desist orders in WERC v.
Evansville.3 Basing its decision on the guidelines of the 1969
United States Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.,24 the court affirmed WERC's order requiring the City of
Evansville to recognize the Teamsters' Union as collective bar-
gaining representative despite the absence of a valid
representation election.
An election was held, after which the union filed objections.
At the post-election hearing, it was determined that the city
had committed prohibited practices during the pre-election
campaign in violation of the Wisconsin Statutes.2 The WERC
examiner found that the nature of the prohibited practices was
so extreme that a mere cease and desist order would be inade-
quate to restore an atmosphere conducive to a fair election. He
based his decision on three incidents. First, the mayor and
common council sent letters threatening a loss of benefits to
employees if the union won the election. Second, a coercive
conversation between a municipal employee and his supervisor
occurred within the hearing of other employees. The supervisor
demanded to know whether the employee was a member of the
union, stating that if he did not tell him, he would find out one
way or another. Third, a meeting of public works department
employees was called by the director of public works, during
which the director stated that the election of the union as
collective bargaining agent would do nothing to insure job secu-
rity and might induce the city to subcontract certain work done
23. 69 Wis. 2d 140, 230 N.W.2d 688 (1975).
24. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).




The court determined that although these incidents had not
totally destroyed the possibility of a fair election, they were of
such a nature as to be suspect bf undermining the majority
strength of the employees, all but one of whom had signed
authorization cards prior to the threats. The court indicated
that the employer was responsible for clouding the antiseptic
conditions required for a fair election, and should not be re-
warded for prohibited practices by simply requiring another
election to be held. The court noted that Gissell required an
administrative finding that there was only a slim possibility
that traditional cease and desist orders would protect the privi-
leges of the employees before a recognition order might be is-
sued as an alternative. Based on the finding that the city had
threatened loss of benefits with a union, promised benefits
without a union, and threatened subcontracting and potential
elimination of jobs, the court found that the recognition order
of WERC was valid under section 111.07(4) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.
The court also dealt with the subsidiary issue of the dura-
tion of the recognition order by stating that the order would be
valid for one year, commencing the day of its decision, and that
the employer's statutory right 6 to assert a good faith doubt as
to the union's majority status would be suspended for one year
from the effective date of the recognition order.
Madison Joint School District v. WERC 7 represents a deci-
sion of potentially far reaching effect. Justice Day wrote the
majority opinion which upheld the WERC and Circuit Court
findings that by refusing to bargain in good faith with an exclu-
sive bargaining agent, and by interfering with the right of em-
ployees to bargain collectively with the agent of their choice,
the school board had violated Wisconsin's Municipal Employ-
ment Relations Act (MERA). 8
The Madison Joint School District No. 8 was in the midst
of negotiations with Madison Teachers, Inc. (MTI) in which a
"fair-share" provision and binding arbitration of nonrenewal of
teacher contracts and dismissal of teachers were at issue. At a
public" meeting of the school board, a non-union teacher who
26. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(3)(a)4 (1973).
27. 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N.W.2d 206 (1975).
28. WIS. STAT. § 111.70(3)(a)1, 4 (1973)
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had circulated a petition against the fair-share provision was
allowed to speak during a public portion of the meeting. He
proposed a one-year deferral of any such fair-share provision
and, alternatively, an impartial study of such a proposal. Other
people spoke during this public portion of the meeting, includ-
ing the president of MTI. Subsequently in executive session,
the board drafted a proposal, eventually accepted by MTI,
which included an arbitration provision, but explicitly refused
to incorporate the fair-share (agency shop) proposal. MTI
eventually filed the unfair labor practice complaint with
WERC, which was the subject of this action.
The majority opinion, citing Board of School Directors of
Milwaukee v. WERC, 1 re-emphasized the rule that a majority
bargaining representative is not only the representative of the
majority, but is to be the exclusive bargaining representative
of all employees, "members or non-members, of the bargaining
unit." ° The court realized that this principle of exclusivity
might infringe upon the first amendment rights of those not
within the majority, but felt that such infringement was justi-
fied because the ". . . gravity of evil was considered out-
weighed by the necessity to avoid the dangers attendant upon
relative chaos in labor management relations."31
The majority hinged its decision on a determination that
the speech of the minority teachers at the public portion of the
school board meeting was "negotiating" as defined in Board of
School Directors of Milwaakee v. WERC:
[T]o communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at
a settlement of some matter: meet with another so as to arrive
through discussion at some kind of agreement or compromise
about something: come to terms [especially] in state mat-
ters by meetings and discussions.2
In concluding that the public portion of the school board
meeting was part of the negotiating process, the majority
viewed the present status of the negotiations and the circum-
stances surrounding the meeting as controlling. The court
noted that an impasse had been reached, that the meeting was
29. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
30. Madison Joint School District v. WERC, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 209, 231 N.W.2d 206,
211 (1975).
31. Id. at 212, 231 N.W.2d at 213.
32. Id. at 212-13, 231 N.W.2d at 213.
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picketed by the majority union, that union members were pres-
ent at the meeting and that union representatives addressed
the board on subjects of the collective bargaining negotiations.
The context of the meeting, rather than the nature of the non-
union teacher's statement, was held to be determinative. Thus,
the court held that the teacher's statement was an attempt to
circumvent the majority representative, and the action of the
school board in listening to the statement was found to be an
unlawful refusal to bargain with the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative.
In a vigorous dissent Justice Robert W. Hansen, joined by
Justices Beilfuss and Connor T. Hansen, found that the major-
ity decision went far beyond enforcement of the Municipal
Employment Relations Act by denying "constitutional assur-
ances as to freedom of speech and petition ' 3 3 to the minority
teachers. The minority opinion declared that the right to speak
at the public portion of a school board meeting extends to all
the public, including all teachers. Justice Hansen also pointed
out that if a balancing of interests is to be performed, the
statutory restriction, not the constitutional guarantee, must
yield. The dissent rightfully feared the "chilling effect"3 of a
decision which adopts an interpretation of "matters subject to
collective bargaining" so broad as to deny any teacher or indi-
vidual the right to state his position on a matter of community
interest and well-being.
During the term the court announced two important deci-
sions in the area of sex discrimination. The first, Yanta v.
Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc. , 35 dealt with the issue of
whether a complainant could maintain a civil suit for damages
against her employer who had been found to have discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of sex.
The plaintiff, Delores Yanta, sought damages for lost
wages, emotional anguish, personal inconvenience, legal fees
and harm to character and reputation. In her discrimination
suit brought by the Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations (DILHR), only prospective relief had been awarded.
She was ordered reinstated to her position.
In the civil suit, the supreme court allowed back pay under
33. Id. at 217, 231 N.W.2d at 215.
34. Id. at 222, 231 N.W.2d at 218.
35. 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1975).
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Wisconsin Statute section 111.36(3)(b), despite the fact that
this provision was not enacted into law until after the discrimi-
nation against the plaintiff occurred." The court made a policy
determination that a defendant should be required to compen-
sate a plaintiff for causing the kind of harm that a statute was
created to prevent-the loss of wages described in Wisconsin
Statutes section 111.31. The court found that the complaint
stated a cause of action for damages, in that it sought the
recovery of lost wages. This is the first time the court had
sustained such a cause of action. The court limited the recov-
ery, however, by denying damages for emotional anguish, harm
to character and reputation and attorneys' fees, since section
111.31 does not provide compensation for loss or damages of
this kind. The court also pointed out that such damages were
not recoverable under recent case law.37
The Yanta case was also the first to delineate the proper
statute of limitations for back pay claims in employment dis-
crimination cases by concluding the six-year statute of limita-
tions under Wisconsin Statutes section 893.19(b) was applica-
ble. That section provides a six-year limitations period where
liability is imposed by statute, but no other statutorily pre-
scribed limitation is applicable.
Finally, in Wisconsin Telephone Company v. ILHR, 5 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Department of Indus-
try, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) had the authority
to decide a contested case of discrimination based upon its
statutory authority,39 despite improperly filed sex discrimina-
tion guidelines.
A complaint was filed against Wisconsin Telephone by a
blind, pregnant employee who was told by her supervisor that
the normal duration of pregnancy was six months. She alleged
in her complaints, that she involuntarily signed a request for a
six-month leave. When she attempted to return to work three
36. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 268, effective June 15, 1974.
37. Cedarburg Light & Water Comm. v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 120, 166
N.W.2d 165 (1969)-attorney fees not allowed absent express statutory liability;
School District No. i v. ILHR Dept., 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974); Ver Hagen
v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349,
124 N.W.2d 312 (1963)-no recovery for emotional distress absent a severely debilitat-
ing emotional response.
38. 68 Wis. 2d 345, 228 N.W.2d 649 (1975).
39. Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5)(g) (1973).
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months after her leave began, she was told that no work was
available and was not reemployed until after she filed her com-
plaint. DILHR found the employer guilty of sex discrimination
and ordered that the employee be granted all seniority to date
and disability benefits which would have been allocated had
her pregnancy been treated as any other temporary disability.
DILHR further required the employer in the future to treat
pregnancy disability in the same manner as any other
disability.
The supreme court upheld the trial court in overturning
DILHR's award based on three procedural defects: (1) insuffi-
cient notice under Wisconsin Statutes sections 111.36(3)(a)
and 227.09; (2) failure to satisfy the oral argument requirement
of Wisconsin Statutes sections 227.12 and 15.06(6), which the
court determined required two commissioners to be present;
and (3) the invalidity of the department's guidelines on sex
discrimination which were not properly filed with the Secretary
of State and Reviser of Statutes pursuant to Wisconsin Stat-
utes section 227.023. Despite these defects, the court did not
dismiss the action, but rather remanded it to DILHR for fur-
ther proceedings after upholding the Department's authority to
find sex discrimination based on differential treatment without
business justification.
The court distinguished a recent United States Supreme
Court case, Geduldig v. Aiello,4" which upheld an exclusion
from insurance coverage based on pregnancy despite an equal
protection challenge. Reasoning that men were receiving no
additional coverage under the policy, the Court stated that
public policy allowed the state legislature to make exclusions
in the interest of keeping the contribution rate minimal for low
income employees.
The Wisconsin court held that the Geduldig case was based
only on the fourteenth amendment and interpreted Wiscon-
sin's sex discrimination statute4 as not being limited to find-
ings of discrimination based only upon fourteenth amendm-
ment violations. It noted that the Wisconsin act is to be "liber-
ally construed"4 and, therefore, that the Department could
rule against practices which merely have a discriminatory im-
pact.
MARK W. SCHNEIDER
40. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
41. WIs. STAT. § 111.32(5)(g) (1973).
42. Wis. STAT. § 111.31(3) (1973).
[Vol. 59
